Renaming of six places by China in Arunachal Pradesh was not in retaliation for the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state, but a way to convey Beijing’s resoluteness in not making any concessions to New Delhi in border talks, a Chinese expert has said. View more at #Hindustan360.
Long Xingchun, Director at the Centre for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, said Beijing was magnanimous in not retaliating against New Delhi’s provocations by arranging the Tibetan spiritual leader’s repeated visits to Arunachal Pradesh. He also said some “radical” Indians were naive in thinking that New Delhi could out-do Beijing in armed clashes. In fact, Long said, India, which had more advantages in the 1962 war with China, should learn from its “erroneous strategic judgements”.
“Indian media outlets believe the move (renaming of six towns in Arunachal Pradesh) is China’s revenge against the 14th Dalai Lama’s visit to the disputed region on the China-India border. The standardisation of names demonstrates China is less likely to make concessions in border negotiations with India.” Long wrote in the state-run Global Times daily.
Dalai Lama to visit the disputed land
“New Delhi has arranged the Dalai Lama to visit the disputed area several times, attempting to strengthen control over South Tibet. Beijing, for the sake of friendly ties with New Delhi, only lodged diplomatic representations rather than taking retaliatory measures against India’s provocations.”
Beijing calls the spiritual leader as a secessionist and claims Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. China and India fought a brief war in 1962 over the region in which the latter was defeated. Border disputes are core conflicts between Beijing and New Delhi. The 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes turned the friendly bilateral relationship into a confrontation.
Since the mechanism of the Special Representatives’ Meeting for the China-India Boundary Question was established in 2003, China and India have held 19 rounds of border talks. Both sides have kept border disputes under control and prevented them from impacting their diplomatic bilateral ties. Some radical Indians believe India’s military strength has seen rapid growth and are eager to triumph over China in potential armed clashes. In fact, India had more advantages in 1962, and it should learn from its erroneous strategic judgments and carefully evaluate the current international situation.
Long admitted the issues of India’s clamouring for a berth in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and branding Pakistani militant Masood Azhar as an international terrorist were two “friction points” between New Delhi and Beijing. Last year, China rejected New Delhi’s application to enter the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group and put a technical hold on its resolution against Azhar, who India calls a chief plotter of attack on its army base.
Difficulties for India
The launch of China’s second aircraft carrier, expected as soon as this week, will be an important and depressing moment for India. The “Type 001A” — likely to be named the “Shandong” — will give China an edge for the first time in the carrier race with its Asian rival, a literal two-to-one advantage. After decommissioning the INS Viraat earlier this year, the Indian Navy is down to a single carrier, INS Vikramaditya. Worse, the Shandong has been built at China’s own giant shipyard at Dalian; Vikramaditya is merely a repurposed 1980s-era Russian carrier formerly known as the Admiral Gorshkov.
No one would expect India to match China’s defense spending head-to-head. China’s economy is four times the size of India’s; not surprisingly, its defense budget is at least three times larger. But the People’s Republic faces a parallel dilemma when confronting the US, whose military budget is about three times as big as China’s.
View more at #Hindustan360.